A review of Drew Dalton, The Ethics of Resistance: Tyranny of the Absolute, pp. 154.

ABSTRACTA number of philosophers within critical race theory use phenomenology to describe the way in which their identities are always already constituted as delinquent within the consciousness of white people, and how their own identity fractures in relation to this white gaze – a fracturing that creates unspeakable ontological, and ultimately physical, violence. Though these philosophers are already doing phenomenology in their work, there is a deeper level of analysis that has yet to be given. Specifically, an account has not (...) yet been provided as regards the production of the white gaze within the consciousness of white people. That is, how is an already racialized world of experience produced prior to any active reflection? In this essay, I engage George Yancy’s famous elevator example, using Edmund Husserl’s concepts of apperception, internal time consciousness and passive synthesis to give a phenomenological description of the production of a pre-reflective racialized world. (shrink)

The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, (...) the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. (shrink)

The following discussion' of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv originated in an examination of the tradition of the fragments of Parmenides. It is therefore illustrated not only from Simplicius but particularly from the texts of Parmenides quoted by him. This will not be misleading, since, though many of these texts are quoted by Simplicius more than once, there is little or no sign in any manuscript of interpolation from one passage to another and it is (...) not likely that any scribe could have interpolated the text from an independent manuscript of Parmenides. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.4 (2003) iv [Access article in PDF] Editors' Remarks I am pleased to announce that Gerard Hauser will assume the editorship of Philosophy and Rhetoric. Professor Hauser has been closely associated with the journal for decades, and I can think of no one better suited to realizing its distinctive mission. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to the many authors and reviewers who have contributed (...) to the achievement of this journal. Henry, be assured, would have been pleased. Stephen H. Browne * * *Assuming the editorship of Philosophy and Rhetoric is a joyous return to a prior calling. My association with the journal as its book review editor, as Donald Verene's associate editor, and as Henry Johnstone's co-editor marked active engagement in the first quarter-century of its contribution to the ancient dialogue reflected in its name. I am honored to have been asked to succeed Stephen Browne, who has provided a decade of leadership in sustaining the journal's high standards. As editor, my intention is to continue Philosophy and Rhetoric's tradition of advancing deep scholarship and new thought in the areas reflected in its statement of purpose. Gerard A. Hauser... (shrink)

As part of the SYNBIOSAFE project, we carried out an open electronic conference (e-conference), with the aim to stimulate an open debate on the societal issues of synthetic biology in a proactive way. The e-conference attracted 124 registered participants from 23 different countries and different professional backgrounds, who wrote 182 contributions in six different categories: (I) Ethics; (II) Safety; (III) Security; (IV) IPR; (V) Governance and regulation; (VI) and Public perception. In this paper we discuss the main arguments brought up (...) during the e-conference and provide our conclusions about how the community thinks, and thinks differently on the societal impact of synthetic biology. Finally we conclude that there is a chance for an open discourse on the societal issues of synthetic biology happening, and that the rules to govern such a discourse might be set up much easier and be respected more readily than many would suggest. (shrink)

This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...) with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)

The first paper in this pair (Bickhard in Axiomathes, 2015) developed a model of the nature of representation and cognition, and argued for a model of the micro-functioning of the brain on the basis of that model. In this sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented (...) here: sometimes called the Predictive Brain approach. (shrink)

In Part IV of Book I of Hume’s Treatise Hume frequently appeals to an identity-ascribing mechanism of the imagination. A psychological mechanism of which it is a special case, to ‘compleat the union’, is also prominent. These mechanisms belong to the imagination narrowly conceived according to a distinction in section ix of Part III. The role and significance of these mechanisms in the development of Hume’s scepticism is explored. Appreciation of their significance is also argued to cast light on Hume’s (...) refusal to locate necessity in objects and to suggest a plausible explanation of his second thoughts about personal identity. (shrink)

Standard semantic information processing models—information in; information processed; information out —lend themselves to standard models of the functioning of the brain in terms, e.g., of threshold-switch neurons connected via classical synapses. That is, in terms of sophisticated descendants of McCulloch and Pitts models. I argue that both the cognition and the brain sides of this framework are incorrect: cognition and thought are not constituted as forms of semantic information processing, and the brain does not function in terms of passive input (...) processing units organized as neural nets. An alternative framework is developed that models cognition and thought not in terms of semantic information processing, and, correspondingly, models brain functional processes also not in terms of semantic information processing. As alternative to such models: I outline a pragmatist oriented, interaction based, model of representation; derive from this model a fundamental framework of constraints on how the brain must function; show that such a framework is in fact found in the brain, and develop the outlines of a broader model of how mental processes can be realized within this alternative framework. Part I of this discussion focuses on some criticisms of standard modeling frameworks for representation and cognition, and outlines an alternative interactivist, pragmatist oriented, model. In part II, the focus is on the fact that the brain does not, in fact, function in accordance with standard passive input processing models—e.g., information processing models. Instead, there are multiple endogenously active processes at multiple spatial and temporal scales across multiple kinds of cells. A micro-functional model that accounts for, and even predicts, these multi-scale phenomena in generating emergent representation and cognition is outlined. That is, I argue that the interactivist model of representation outlined offers constraints on how the brain should function that are in fact empirically found, and, in reverse, that the multifarious details of brain functioning entail the pragmatist representational model—a very strong interrelationship. In the sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented here: sometimes called the predictive brain approach. (shrink)

Nagarjuna in China. A Translation of the Middle Treatise. Brian Bocking. The Edwin Mellor Press, Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter 1994. iv, 499 pp. £59.95, US$119.95.

The various attempts to make sense of ‘sequitur,’ e.g. Palmer ‘naturally follows,’ taking pudor as subject and amorem as object, seem to me most unsatisfactory. Sedlmayer reads ‘quitur’ which Palmer calls ‘mira coniectura.’ But it is obvious that as far as sense and transcriptional probability go the correction is excellent, and also that since a passive infinitive is understood, it is grammatically right or at least would be if we found it in Lucretius. The only, and it may be thought (...) fatal, objection is that this passive use of potestur, quitur, nequitur, etc., has not been found in any writ er later than Lucretius, with the possible and not very relevant exception of Apuleius. Birt, the original author of the conjecture, met this objection by adducing other archaisms in Ovid. My purpose here is not to discuss these, but to add to them the fact that Quintilian did not consider that quitur was obsolete. (shrink)

Since P. Thielscher, in Philologus, 1907, pp. 117, 128, supplies us with information about the Manilian MS. Palatinus 1711 , the importance of which he himself does not seem to comprehend, I should like to point out what an interesting MS. this is. ‘It is to be suspected,’ says Thielscher, ‘that it offers interpolated readings.’ It is not a matter of ‘suspicion’ at all. If Thielscher did not know it for himself, he could have learnt from Scaliger , from Bentley, (...) from Jacob, that the readings of P long ago received sufficient publicity to enable scholars to assign it to the ‘ interpolated’ class of MSS. The Variae Lectiones of Junius is mostly occupied with the readings of P, and tells us all about P that we need know, save what Thielscher has himself added. From Thielscher we for the first time learn that P belonged to ‘Johannes Archiepiscopus Strigoniensis,’ and that it contains this subscription: ‘legi et emendaui cum magistro Galeotto 1469.’ Now just as Thielscher seems to know nothing of Junius, so he seems to have no idea who Johannes Strigoniensis is, though the reference to Galeotto and the year 1469 should at once have told him. If he had troubled to look at Schmitt's Archiepiscopi he would have found that, while Schmitth enumerates no less than six archbishops of Gran who bore the name John, yet the only one of them who fits the date 1469 is John IV. And John IV. is a famous person, being none other than that leader of the Hungarian Renaissance whom we commonly call Vitezius. (shrink)

My paper, written in 1911, was something of a ballon d'essai, and I acknowledge frankly one or two mistakes. Thus I did not know that Euripides wrote a Thyestes; and again one or two of my references were wrong: in excuse I may perhaps plead that I have not had access to a Latin book for nearly two years. Apart from this I will now make only two observations:1. I set aside the evidence of Cod. Paris. Lat. 7530 because I (...) was dealing with evidence of saec. i.-iv. Cod. Paris. Lat. 7530 shows that some persons at the end of saec. viii. ascribed the Thyestes to L. Varius Rufus. So did persons in saec. iv. In addition, Cod. Paris. Lat. 7530 gives a date for the Thyestes. To Mr. Housmanthis date is certain; if it is uncertain a large part of his argument comes to nothing. But who can think it certain ? It comes to us from the end of the eighth century. If it came to us from Jerome's Chronicle we could still not think it certain, though we should know whence Jerome derived it. We do not now whence Cod. Paris. Lat. 7530 derived it. The reference to Actium may have no better source than the wish to connect a great literary and a great political event: and the gossip about the playwright's profits seems to me in itself suspicious.2. The main contention of the early part of my paper was that the evidence of the relevant MSS. as between Vari and Varii, etc., amounts to nothing either way. I do not think Mr. Housman is prepared seriously to contest this proposition. (shrink)

In this book I have tried to develop an analysis of the concept of an empirical law, an analysis that differs in many ways from the alternative analyse's found in contemporary literature dealing with the subject. 1 am referring especially to two well-known views, viz. the regularity and necessity views, which have given rise to many interesting papers and books within the philosophy of science. In developing my own views, it very soon became clear to me that the mere restatement (...) of these alternative views, followed by a discussion of their defects and an explanation of my own view, would not suffice to show what 1 regard as basically unsound in these views. If we seriously consider the well-known difficulties facing the regularity view, we have to consider the possibility that the time has arrived to stop our attempts to solve, by means of patch-work additions, the fundamental problem of empirical laws within the traditional context of logical positivist doctrines. I have tried to find a solution which is based on a different philosophical context, the main incentive being that the discouraging results of the customary attempts to solve the problem might have been the outcome of the fundamental philosophical setting within which the problem had been formulated and within which everyone looked for a solution. The problem of empirical laws is not a problem existing by its own rights - it is shaped by an underlying point of view or theoretical framework. For this reason I have started with a brief sketch of the logical positivist context. However, I want to stress the fact that my intention was not to offer an historical exposition, but an exposition which becomes meaningful when related to the subsequent arguments concerning empirical laws. The notion of direct or theory-free observation has been taken as the fundamental characteristic of the logical positivist point of view. This view has been further characterised by means of five theses, among which is the thesis that observational terms are isolated or theory-independent units of extensional meaning. These terms are then supposed to be the starting-points of meaning and the end-points of confirmation, and these very characteristics mark the privileged position such terms have in a logical positivist philosophy. The post-positivist view, on the other hand, is characterised by the opposing notion of theory-loaded observation. This notion leads to other conclusions which radically oppose some of the theses of logical positivism. The notion of theory- loaded observation itself, although often clearly stated, has not yet been systematically elucidated, and I have made an attempt to do this in ch. I after my sketch of the logical positivist context. This seemed to me to be necessary in order to make my post-positivist point of view as clear as possible, before tackling the problem of empirical law itself. I have paid special attention to the lawlikeness of concepts and their confirmation and falsification. These epistemological issues are followed by a separate examination of Goodman's riddle in ch. II, because it lies somewhere between the lawlikeness of concepts and the lawlikeness of laws. If Goodman's riddle is taken as a serious problem, as I think it should, it is primarily a problem of concept or theory formation and not a problem of induction. In ch. III the regularity view has been examined and the well-known difficulties related to such a view are considered, assuming the knowledge gained in ch. I. This has led to some interesting results, especially in connection with the analysis of counterfactuals and the confirmation of 'normal' singular conditionals, to which I return in the last chapter. Three different views of the necessity view are briefly stated and investigated in ch. IV. RESCHER'S view is, I think, close to mine, which has been developed in ch. V. However, there are fundamental epistemological differences between our views. In the last chapter I have given my own analysis of the concept of an empirical law, which should not be taken as a synthesis of a regularity and a necessity view, but as opposed to both. It is, as far as particulars may count, the result of an analysis of the concepts 'regularity' and 'necessity'. I have tried to argue that the greatest shortcoming of the regularity view lies in the fact that the proponents of such a view have not been really concerned with the concept of 'regularity' itself. They usually take this concept to be intuitively clear enough to serve as basis for their analysis. Their attacks upon the necessity view are based on the reproach that 'necessity' is a very obscure concept, and that it should, therefore, be avoided in the philosophy of science. We could, however, reproach them in a similar way, since the concept of 'regularity' is anything but clear. One may say that an empirical law formulates a 'regularity in nature', but we can only do justice to the function a law has in science, if we are ready to view this regularity as a necessary connection, which does not exist in an observer-independent reality, but in a theoretically co-constituted empirical world. This investigation does not pretend to answer all questions concerning empirical laws. It should, therefore, not be regarded as complete, but neither should the arguments and suggestions be regarded as completely free from ambiguity. Much remains to be done in order to offer a generally acceptable theory and better understanding. (shrink)

A fundamentally new understanding of the classical electromagnetic interaction of a point charge and a magnetic dipole moment through order v 2 /c 2 is suggested. This relativistic analysis connects together hidden momentum in magnets, Solem's strange polarization of the classical hydrogen atom, and the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. First we review the predictions following from the traditional particle-on-a-frictionless-rigid-ring model for a magnetic moment. This model, which is not relativistic to order v 2 /c 2 , does reveal a connection between (...) the electric field of the point charge and hidden momentum in the magnetic moment; however, the electric field back at the point charge due to the Faraday-induced changing magnetic moment is of order 1/c 4 and hence is negligible in a 1/c 2 analysis. Next we use a relativistic magnetic moment model consisting of many superimposed classical hydrogen atoms (and anti-atoms) interacting through the Darwin Lagrangian with an external charge but not with each other. The analysis of Solem regarding the strange polarization of the classical hydrogen atom is seen to give a fundamentally different mechanism for the electric field of the passing charge to change the magnetic moment. The changing magnetic moment leads to an electric force back at the point charge which (i) is of order 1/c 2 , (ii) depends upon the magnetic dipole moment, changing sign with the dipole moment, (iii) is odd in the charge q of the passing charge, and (iv) reverses sign for charges passing on opposite sides of the magnetic moment. Using the insight gained from this relativistic model and the analogy of a point charge outside a conductor, we suggest that a realistic multi-particle magnetic moment involves a changing magnetic moment which keeps the electromagnetic field momentum constant. This means also that the magnetic moment does not allow a significant shift in its internal center of energy. This criterion also implies that the Lorentz forces on the charged particle and on the point charge are equal and opposite and that the center of energy of each moves according to Newton's second law F=Ma where F is exactly the Lorentz force. Finally, we note that the results and suggestion given here are precisely what are needed to explain both the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift and the Aharonov–Casher phase shift as arising from classical electromagnetic forces. Such an explanation reinstates the traditional semiclassical connection between classical and quantum phenomena for magnetic moment systems. (shrink)